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Notes
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A LIFE ESTATE
WITH THE POWER TO CONSUME
A testator will quite often devise property to his surviving spouse
for life with the power to consume the property for the spouse's bene-
fit, with remainder over of whatever is left at her death.1 Such a
devise enables the testator to make ample provision for his wife while
she lives, and at the same time he can control the ultimate ownership
of so much of the property as is not needed to support his wife.
Ideally, this devise would provide great flexibility in handling the
estate. However, the life estate with the power to consume has
resulted in an undesirable amount of litigation. Careful draftsmanship
is essential if the necessity of court interpretation of the will or deed
is to be avoided. One problem of draftsmanship arises whenever the
testator's estate is large enough to be subject to the federal estate tax.
The lawyer drafting the instrument will want to take care to insure
that the devise will not result in the property's being taxed in the
estates of both the testator and the surviving spouse. The purpose of
this note is to discuss the means by which the devise can be made to
qualify for the marital deduction or, in the alternative, be excluded
from the wife's estate at her death.
The Marital Deduction
The marital deduction was enacted in 1948 by Congress in an
effort to equalize the federal estate tax burden in common law and
1 It is difficult to give a clear and accurate definition of a power to consume.
However, two examples of a power to consume may be helpful:
(1) "to my wife for life, with the power in my wife to sell and use
the proceeds of so much of the property as she shall deem
necessary for her support and maintenance, remainder to . . .(2) "to my wife for life, with the power in my wife in her absolute
discretion to sell the property and use the proceeds as she sees
fit for her comfort, pleasure and happiness, remainder if any to
In the first example, the power to consume is limited; in the second, the power
is so broad as to make it difficult to distinguish from an inter vivos general power
of appointment. However, there is one important restriction imposed on all
powers to consume. The power must be exercised for the personal benefit of the
donee of the power. See, Page, Wills, sec. 1321 (3d ed. 1941). In many cases,
it is very difficult to determine the exact nature of the first taker's interest-
whether a mere life estate, a life estate with the power to consume, a life estate
with a broad power to dispose, a life estate with a general power of appointment,
or a fee simple. This problem is beyond the scope of this note. See, Matthews,
"Remnant Gifts Over in Kentucky, 44 Ky. L.J. 397 (1956).
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community property states. In general, a deduction, limited to one-
half the value of the decedents adjusted gross estate, is allowed for
the value of all property passing from the decedent to his surviving
spouse. However, when property is devised to the surviving spouse
for life with remainder over to third persons, the spouse's interest is
usually classified as a "terminable interest" which does not qualify
for the marital deduction.2 In a community property state, the sur-
viving spouse's interest which is not included in the estate of the first
to die is an undivided one-half interest in fee. The achievement of
equality between common law and community property states re-
quires that the interest passing to the surviving spouse in a common
law state be the qualitative equivalent of the interest of the spouse in
the community property state before it will qualify for the marital
deduction. In a community property state, the first spouse to die can-
not control the disposition of the surviving spouse's interest in the
community property; hence, the first to die in the common law state
should not get a marital deduction if he can control the disposition
of the property at the surviving spouse's death.3
An exception to the terminable interest rule exists when the sur-
viving spouse possesses certain specified rights in addition to a life
estate and is considered the virtual owner of the property. Under
Section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, a life estate
qualifies for the marital deduction if five conditions are met: (1) The
surviving spouse must be entitled to all the income from all or a
specific portion of the property; (2) the income must be payable an-
nually or at more frequent intervals; (3) the surviving spouse must
have the power to appoint the entire interest to herself or her estate;
(4) the power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her
alone and in all events; and (5) the entire interest must not be subject
to a power in any other person to appoint the property to any person
other than the surviving spouse.4 Another type of devise or bequest
which is not classified as an objectionable terminable interest is the
"estate trust." The marital deduction is available when property is
left in trust to the surviving spouse for life, remainder to the spouse's
estate.5 The question arises whether a devise or bequest to the sur-
viving spouse for life with the power to consume the principal qualifies
2Int. Rev. Code of 1954, see. 2056(b)(1).
3 S. Rep. No. 1018, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 285, 305;
Anderson, "The Marital Deduction and Equalization under the Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes between Common Law and Community Property States," 54
Mich. L. Rev. 1087, 1101 (1956); Surrey, "Federal Taxation of the Family-The
Revenue Act of 1948," 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1948).
4 U.S. Treas. Reg., see. 20.2056(b)-5(a) (1956).
5 Id., see. 20.2056(e)-2(b).
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for the marital deduction under Section 2056(b)(5). If the power
to consume is limited to the surviving spouse's necessary support and
maintenance, it is clear that the interest will not qualify.6 Moreover,
even though the power to consume is unlimited in amount, it appears
that the marital deduction will not be available.
Prior to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the exception to the
terminable interest rule was limited to equitable life estates.7 The
courts have been unanimous in holding that legal life estates with a
general power of appointment do not qualify for the marital deduction
in estates of decedents dying before 1954.8 The present Section 2056
of the 1954 Code eliminated the requirement that the life estate be in
trust,9 but the power of appointment necessary under that section
does not seem to include an unlimited power to consume.
Some courts have taken the view that to fall within the exception,
the surviving spouse must be able to dispose of the property in any
manner, including the power to appoint the property to herself free
from the interests of the remaindermen. This attitude was reflected
recently by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pipes
Estate v. Commissioner."0 The wife was given a legal life estate with
the power to "use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and principal
. . . for such purposes or in such manner, as she in her uncontrolled
discretion may choose."" The case arose under the 1948 provisions,
but the estate argued that the exception was applicable because the
6 In such a case, the property would not be included in the estate of the
surviving spouse if unconsumed at her death. Congress has made it clear that the
marital deduction will not be available unless the property will be subjected to the
federal estate or gift tax if not consumed by the surviving spouse. S. Rep. No.
1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 285 842.7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, see. 812(e)(1)(F), added by 62 Stat. 117 (1948).
However, on August 16, 1957, the House of Representatives passed a proposed
amendment to sec. 812 of the 1939 Code which would allow legal life estates
coupled with a power of appointment to qualify for the marital deduction for
estates of decedents dying after April 1, 1948 and before August 17, 1954. The
bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee. H.R. 8881, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957), 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep., para. 8452 (1957).8 See, Estate of Wallace S. Howell, 28 T.C. - (No. 142) (1957), CCH Dec.
22, 581, at p. 8032. In a number of cases, it has been argued that the life estate
plus the power to consume gave the surviving spouse a fee which would qualify
for the marital deduction. Such arguments have been unsuccessful. Boyd v. Gray,
58-1 USTC, para. 11,737 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Estate of Wallace S. Howell, supra;
Estate of Delia C. McGehee, 28 T.C. - (No. 44) (1957), CCH Dec. 22, 385;
Estate of Harriet C. Evilsizor, 27 T.C. 710 (No. 81) (1957); Estate of Michael
Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 (No. 116) (1954). It has also been contended that a legal
life estate coupled with a power to consume qualified on the theory that the life
tenant was constructive trustee for the remaindermen.
9H.R. Rep. No. 1837, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 8 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 4025, 4118-19 (1954).
10 241 F. 2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23
T.C. 99 (No. 19) (1954), cert. denied, 78 S.Ct. 15 (1957).
11 Id., at 211.
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wife held the property as constructive trustee for the remaindermen
under New York law. Accepting this contention arguendo, the court
held that the devise still failed to qualify for the marital deduction.
The court stated:
During her lifetime no restraint whatsoever is imposed upon her power
to consume or dispose of the principal of her life estate as she wishes.
She has the power to consume, but she may not devise or bequeath
any unconsurned corpus at her death to beneficiaries of her own
choice. Thus her power under the terms of Mr. Pipe's will is not the
"unlimited power to invade" referred to in the Regulations, because
to comply with that requirement, the "power in the surviving spouse
must be a power to appoint the corpus to herself as unqualified
owner or to appoint corpus as a part of her estate, that is, in effect, to
dispose of it to whomever she pleases." U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, see.
81.47a. Or in the language of the statute itself, the surviving spouse
must be able to appoint the entire corpus "free of the trust" to her-
self. This Mrs. Pipe cannot do, because as long as any of the corpus
of the estate remains, it will be held "in trust" for the named re-
maindermen.12
In Estate of Delia C. McGehee,1 3 the Tax Court followed the Pipe
case when the surviving husband was given a legal life estate with
the power "to use the income and corpus thereof in such manner as
he may determine, without restriction or restraint."
Since both the Pipe and McGehee cases were decided under the
1948 provisions which 'excepted only equitable life estates over which
the surviving spouse had a general power of appointment, it is argu-
able that the view that an unlimited power to consume does not
qualify is only dictum. Certainly, the court in the Pipe case was in-
correct in stating that the surviving spouse must have the power to
appoint the property by will. The Code provides that a general power
of appointment will qualify "whether exercisable by will or during
life."14
The present regulations governing Section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954
Code also indicate that an unlimited power to consume is not sufficient
to qualify a life estate for the marital deduction. While the regulations
recognize that "an unlimited power to invade" constitutes a power of
appointment exercisable in favor of the surviving spouse, the tradi-
tional meaning of an unlimited power to consume falls short of quali-
fying as "an unlimited power to invade." The regulations state:
In order for a power of invasion to be exercisable in all events, the
surviving spouse must have the unrestricted power exercisable at any
time during her life to use all or any part of the property subject
12 Id., at 213.
1 t28 T.C. - (No. 44) (1957), CCH Dec. para. 22,885, atp. 2551.1 4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 2056(b) (5).
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to the power, and to dispose of it in any manner, including the power
to dispose of it by gift .15 (emphasis added)
Since the donee of a power to consume does not have the power to
give the property away,16 the regulations do not permit a power to
consume to qualify as a power of appointment within the meaning of
Section 2056(b) (5).
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis'7 supports the position of the regu-
lations. The decedent devised his residuary estate in trust for the
benefit of his wife for life. At the wife's death, one-half of the property
was to pass to the wife's estate and one-half to the decedent's children.
The will provided that the wife was to receive five thousand dollars
annually, and it gave the wife the power to invade the corpus of the
trust for such amounts in excess of five thousand dollars as the wife
should in her sole discretion judge she "required." The Tax Court
held that the entire trust qualified for the marital deduction under
the 1948 provisions. Although holding that one-half of the trust quali-
fied as an "estate trust", the Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court on
the ground that the wife's power to consume did not constitute a power
of appointment within the meaning of the Code. The Court em-
phasized that under Pennsylvania law, the wife did not have the power
to give the property away and that her power to consume could not
be exercised for the purpose of defeating the interests of the re-
maindermen. Hence, the Court concluded that the wife did not have
the power to appoint the corpus during her lifetime "in all events."' 8
15 U.S. Treas. Reg., sec. 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1956). Support for the posi-
tion taken in the regulations can be found in the proposed amendment to Section
812 (e) (1) (F) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. The proposed amendment
is identical with Section 2056 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code except that the
following sentence is added to the last paragraph:
"For the purposes of the preceding sentence, a power is exercisable
in all events if the surviving spouse has the unrestricted power exercis-
able at any time during the life of such spouse to use all or any part
of the property subject to the power, and to dispose of it in any man-
ner, including the power to dispose of it by gift (whether or not such
spouse has the power to dispose of it by will)."
H.R. 8881, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep., para.
8452 (1957). The Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means which
accompanied the bill stated that this reaches the same result as Section 2056(b) (5)
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep., para. 8452,
at p. 7463 (1957).16Collings v. Collings' Exrs, 260 S.W. 2d 935, 937 (Ky. 1953); Evans v.
Leer, 232 Ky. 358, 861-62, 23 S.W. 2d 553, 555 (1980); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1243,
1276-81 (1919) supplemented 27 A.L.R. 1381, 1383-84 (1923), 69 A.L.R. 825,
830 (1930), and 114 A.L.R. 946, 950-51 (1938).
17 252 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958), reversing Estate of Harry A. Ellis, 26 T.C.
694 (No. 85) (1956).38 Id., at 114. On the other hand, the tax court held that it was immaterial
that the power to consume had to be exercised "honestly" under Pennsylvania
[Vol. 46,
A similar result was reached by a district court in Matteson v. United
States,9 in which the will provided that "should my wife ... ever
at any time or times find that the income received by her from the
trust ...is not sufficient, and of its sufficiency she shall be the sole
judge, my said trustees ...shall pay to her so much of the said trust
fund as she shall desire."
A very unjust result is reached by holding that a life estate with
an unlimited power to consume does not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion under Section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 Code. If the marital deduc-
tion is allowed, the property will not escape taxation since it will be
included in the wife's estate at her death under Section 2041 if uncon-
sumed.20 On the other hand, the property will be taxed in both the
husband's and the wife's estate if the deduction is disallowed. In con-
sidering whether Section 2056(b) (5) should be applicable in such
cases, it is helpful to compare the rights of a life tenant with an un-
limited power to consume with (a) the rights of a donee of an inter
vivos general power of appointment and (b) the rights of a donee
with a testamentary general power of appointment. They appear to
be less than the former, (a), but greater than the latter, (b).
Clearly, the rights of a donee of an inter vivos general power of
appointment are substantially greater than those of the life tenant
with a power to consume. The donee of an inter vivos power of ap-
pointment can appoint the property to any person, either by gift or
for consideration.21 On the other hand, the life tenant with a power
to consume cannot give the property away since ordinarily the power
can be exercised only for the life tenant's own benefit.22 The donee of
an inter vivos general power of appointment may appoint the property
law. The court stated:
"This 'restriction' is, however, more apparent than real. It does not
limit her spending or restrict her to any objective standard of living,
but means only that the widow may not so deal with the property as
to leave it unconsumed and yet prevent it from passing to those
chosen by the testator to receive such unconsumed remainder. This
is no restriction on the right to consume, but merely a reminder
that it is a power to consume, and not to preserve, and then to devise
or donate the corpus."
Estate of Harry A. Ellis, 26 T.C. 694, 700 (No. 85) (1956). See also, Rev. Rule
243, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 267.
10 147 F. Supp. 535, 536 (N.D. N.Y. 1956), appeal dismissed on other
grounds, 240 F. 2d 517 (2d Cir. 1956). Cf., Estate of Theodore Geddings
Tarver, 26 T.C. 490 (No. 59) (1956), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 58-2
USTC, para. 11, 805 (4th Cir. 1958).
2) See, supra note 6.
21 By definition, whenever the donee may dispose of any estate or interest in
the property to whomever he pleases, including himself, the donee has a general
power of appointment. St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802, 804-05,
83 S.W. 2d 471, 472 (1935).
22 See authorities cited supra, note 16.
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to himself so that it will become a part of his probate estate if uncon-
sumed at his death. This the life tenant with a power to consume
cannot do. If the property is not consumed by the life tenant during
his lifetime, the property will go over to the named remaindermen.23
Moreover, it is quite clear that the life tenant with a power to consume
has much less than the absolute ownership of a surviving spouse in a
community property state.2 4
However, the rights of a life tenant with the power to consume are
substantially greater than those of a donee of a general testamentary
power of appointment. The latter has no power to enjoy the corpus
of the property during his life. The general rule is that a contract to
exercise a testamentary power in favor of a particular person is unen-
forceable either by the remedy of specific performance or by a judg-
ment for damages. If specific performance were allowed, such con-
tracts would defeat the purposes of the donor of the power since the
donee would then have, in effect, an inter vivos power.2 5 The donee
of a power to consume has much greater rights. He can consume all
the corpus of the property during his life so long as he exercises his
power for the purposes designated by the donor of the power and not
for the purpose of defeating the interests of the remaindermen.20
Most people would consider the power to consume the corpus during
their life a much more valuable property right than the mere power
to determine who shall enjoy the property after their death. If the
deduction is allowed in the case of a general testamentary power of
appointment or estate trust, it is inconsistent to deny the marital de-
233Page, Wills, sec. 1318 (3d ed. 1941); Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs, 260 S.W.
2d 935, 937 (Ky. 1953); Morgan v. Meachem, 279 Ky. 526, 534-39, 130 S.W. 2d
992, 997-99 (1939). If the holder of a power to consume sells the property, the
proceeds are still held in accordance with the terms of the will or deed creating
the power. As stated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky:
"However, the wife's estate was not enlarged by the sale or convey-
ance, but the proceeds still remained subject to the provisions of the
will. Had she consumed the proceeds for comfortable support and
maintenance she would have converted her estate into a fee to that
extent, and have thereby defeated the limitation over. However, she
did not do this, but reinvested the proceeds in other property, that
remained intact at the time of her death. That being true, it was
'estate undisposed of by her,' and passed under the will . . . just
as the original property would have done had there been no sale or
conveyance.
Hicks v. Connor, 210 Ky. 773, 776-77, 276 S.W. 844, 845 (1925). See also,
Struck v. Lilly, 219 Ky. 604, 608, 293 S.W. 153, 154 (1927); Sutton v. Johnson,
127 S.W. 747, 748 (Ky. 1910); Anderson v. Halls Adm'r, 80 Ky. 91, 99-100
(1882).
24 Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F. 2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1958).
25 5 Amer. L. Prop., sec. 23.85 (1952). The only exception to the rule exists
when the contract is to appoint to the taker in default. In such case, the contract
amounts to a release, and the release of a testamentary power is valid. Id., sees.
23.28, 23.36.
26 Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs, 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953).
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duction in the case of a power to consume on the grounds that it is
not the equivalent of the surviving spouse's interest in a community
property state. In the former instances, the interests of the surviving
spouse can by no stretch of the imagination be considered the equiva-
lent of the absolute ownership of the surviving spouse in a community
property state.
Even though the interest of a surviving spouse in a community
property state is greater, it does not necessarily follow that a life
estate with an unlimited power to consume should fail to qualify for
the marital deduction. Congress has not made the interest of a com-
munity property state spouse an absolute test, since the estate trust
and the life estate with a general testamentary power of appointment
qualify under section 2056 of the 1954 Code. The rights of a life
tenant with an unlimited power to consume are substantially greater
than those of a life tenant with a testamentary power of appointment
or of a life beneficiary under an estate trust. Consequently, if the
courts follow the Ellis case, Congress should amend the present Sec-
tion 2056(b)(5) to allow a deduction in the case of an unlimited
power to consume.
2 7
2 7 Apparently, Congress is under the impression that an unrestricted power
to consume would include the power to give the property away. In the Report
of the House Committee on Ways and Means which accompanied the proposed
amendment to Section 812(e) (1)(F), discussed supra note 14, the following
statement appeared:
In addition, the last sentence of subsection (a) of the bill pro-
vides that a power exercisable in all events includes an unrestricted
power exercisable by the surviving spouse at any time during her life
to use all or part of the property subject to the power, where the
power includes the right to dispose of the property in any manner
(including the power to dispose of it by gift), but such right does not
have to include the power to dispose of the property by will. The
purpose of this concluding sentence is to describe the general condi-
tions under which the right of the surviving spouse to use, consume,
or invade the property during life is the equivalent of the right to
dispose of it by will and therefore the equivalent of a general powerof appointment. This provision is intended to insure that the marital
deduction will be allowed in cases where the property subject to thepower would be includible in the gross estat  of th  spo se upon her
death. Thus, where the spouse has a power to consume, invade, or
appropriate the property, and she is the sole judge of what the in-
vasion, consumption, or appropriation is needed for, such a powver isintended to come within this provision. For example, if the surviving
spouse has, in addition to a life interest, the unrestricted right, in her
sole discretion, to invade and use the property generally for her com-
fort, happiness and well being, such a power would meet the test pre-
scribed by the last sentence of subsection (a) even though there is no
separately stated power to dispose of the property. These broad
powers i the surviving spouse to use, consume, or invade give the
spouse an interest equivalent to a general power of appointment,
which makes the property includible in the spouse's gross estate upon
death. From this it follows that the marital deduction is allowable
with respect to such a property interest. This is the result under the
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Estate Tax Consequences to the Donee of a Power to Consume
If the value of real property devised to the surviving spouse for
life with the power to consume for her own benefit does not qualify
for the marital deduction in the decedents estate, the draftsman will
want to take particular care to avoid having the property taxed for
a second time in the estate of the devisee. Under Section 2041 of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code, the value of all property over which the
decedent has a power of appointment created after October 21, 1942,
is included in the decedents gross estate. Since a power of appoint-
ment is defined as a power "which is exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate,"28 a
power to consume is treated as a power of appointment for the pur-
pose of inclusion in the donee's estate. However, an exception to the
general definition of a power of appointment makes it possible to
avoid inclusion of the property in the estate of the donee of the power.
Section 2041(b) (1) (A) provides:
A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for
the benefit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable
standard relating to health, education, support, or maintenance of the
decedent shall not be deemed a general power of appointment.29
Surprising as it may seem, only two cases have been decided which
concerned the inclusion in a donee's estate of property subject to a
power to consume under Section 2041. In Barritt v. Tomlinson,3 0 the
husband devised property to his wife for life, with the power to "use
all or any part of the principal as she may see fit." The district court
held that under Florida law, the wife's power to consume the principal
was limited to her necessary support and maintenance. The court
said the power was limited to an ascertainable standard, and there-
fore, the property was not included in the wife's estate. However, it
should be noted that there is another basis for the Barritt decision.
The husband died in 1944 prior to the enactment of the predecessor
to the present Section 2041. The court held that even if the wife's
power was not limited to an ascertainable standard, the Power of Ap-
1954 Code and the bill makes it clear that it is to be the result under
the 1939 Code." (emphasis added)
2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep., para. 8452 (1957). Except for the requirement
that the surviving spouse must have the power to give the property away, it is
clear that a marital deduction should have been allowed in the Ellis case under
this language. However, if the surviving spouse may give her own property away
and consume the property devised to her for life, how significant is the require-
ment that she must have the power to make a gift of the property?2 8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 2041(b)(1).
29 Id., see. 2041(b) (1) (A).
30 129 F. Supp. 642, 644 (S.D. Fla. 1955).
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pointment Act of 1951 did not apply retroactively to a power created
prior to the enactment of the Act. Consequently, the value of the
Barritt case is limited insofar as powers created after 1951 are con-
cerned. Under essentially the same facts, the court in Cass v. Tomlin-
soni1 followed the Barritt case.
The present Treasury Regulations covering Section- 2041 of the
Code are much more helpful to the draftsman in determining what -
constitutes an ascertainable standard. The regulations provide:
A power to use property for the comfort, welfare, or happiness of the
holder of the power is not limited by the requisite standard. Ex-
amples of powers which are limited by the requisite standard are
powers exercisable for the holder's 'support,' 'support in reasonable
comfort,' 'reasonable comfort and support,' 'maintenance in health
and reasonable comfort,' 'education, including college and professional
education,' 'health,' and 'medical, dental, hospital and nursing ex-
penses and expenses of invalidism. In determining whether a power
is limited by an ascertainable standard, it is immaterial whether the
beneficiary is required to exhaust his other income before a power
can be exercised. The fact that the governing instrument gives the
holder of the power discretion to determine amounts to be distributed
under the power is not in itself an indication that the power is not
limited by the requisite standard.3 2
By following the guide provided in the regulations, the draftsman can,
if desired, give the surviving spouse quite broad powers to consume the
principal without causing the property to be included in her estate at
her death. Of further assistance is the fact that the concept of an
ascertainable standard is applicable to numerous sections of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, and cases interpreting those sections may be
very helpful in drafting a life estate with a power to consume.33
Conclusions
As has been seen, the power to consume can be a trap for the
unwary in estate planning. However, undesirable estate tax conse-
quences need not result from every devise or bequest which makes
31 57-1 USTC, para. 11, 692 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
32 U.S. Treas. Reg., sec. 20.2041-1(c) (2) (1956). However, it would be
dangerous to express the life tenant's discretion in too broad terms. In such case,
the devise might be interpreted as precluding the courts from ever reviewing the
exercise of the power to determine whether the life tenant abused her discretion.
Hosman v. Willett, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 910, 107 S.W. 334, 336 (1908). Since
the power would depend entirely on the holder's desires rather than an objective
standard, the power would not fall within the exception of Section 2041(b) (1) (A)
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
33 Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595 (1949); Merchants National
Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943); Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,
279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F. 2d 287(2d Cir. 1954 ); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F. 2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Goyette v.
United States, 57-2 USTC, para. 11, 710 (S.D. Calif. 1957).
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amply provision for the surviving spouse and yet controls the ultimate
disposition of unconsumed property.
If the estate of the husband is large, and if the estate of the wife
is small, it is very desirable to qualify a devise or bequest for the
marital deduction. Giving the wife a life estate with a broad power
to consume will not qualify for the deduction, and the property will
be taxed for a second time in the estate of the wife if she has not con-
sumed the property at her death. Although the addition of the power
to make a gift of the property would seem to satisfy the requirements
of the Ellis case, the wife would still not have the power to appoint the
property to herself in such a way as to permit her to devise the property
by her will. While Section 2056(b)(5) of the 1954 Code does not
seem to require that the surviving spouse have the power to dispose
of the property by will, it would be unwise for the draftsman to ignore
the Pipe case. Consequently, if the marital deduction is deemed es-
sential, the devise or bequest should give the wife a life estate coupled
with a general intervivos power of appointment, with a remainder
over in default of appointment during her life.
On the other hand, if the wife has a sizeable estate of her own, it
would be unwise to take advantage of the marital deduction since the
estate tax upon the wife's death will be increased. In such a case,
ample provision may be made for the wife without increasing the
size of her estate for federal estate tax purposes. A devise or bequest
to the wife for life with the power to consume so much of the property
as is necessary for her support and maintenance, with remainder over
of whatever remains, will not cause the property to be taxed in the
wife's estate at her death. This type of devise or bequest may also
be desirable when the testator does not wish to give his wife such
extensive rights as accompany a general inter vivos power of appoint-
ment. To this somewhat limited degree, the power to consume may
still remain a useful estate planning device.
James Park, Jr.
NEWSPAPER CARRIER-SERVANT OR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR?
Since the origin of the doctrine of vicarious liability over 200
years ago,' there have been many occasions for courts to consider
whether a particular employment relationship comes within that
I The first case which dealt with vicarious liability was Jones v. Hart, Holt
K.B. 642, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698), where C. J. Holt announced the principles
of vicarious liability.
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